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Yale Global on China (and in Chinese) 
September 12, 2009 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 3 comments 
We’ve linked to pieces on China at YaleGlobal Online in the past, but wanted to make a special note 
that they are now running a Chinese version of their website (also hosted by a Fudan U 
server). YaleGlobal is edited by Nayan Chanda, the author of Bound Together: How Traders, 
Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization (reviewed in Newsweek by Jeff 
Wasserstrom). In addition to encouraging you to jump into the Chinese version of YaleGlobal, 
however, we thought we would also point you to a few recent pieces (in English) that China watchers 
might find interesting. 
1. “Dams in China Turn the Mekong Into a River of Discord” 
A report in May by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Asian Institute of 
Technology (AIT) warned that China’s plan for a cascade of eight dams on the Mekong, which it calls 
the Lancang Jiang, might pose “a considerable threat” to the river and its natural riches. In June, 
Thailand’s prime minister was handed a petition calling for a halt to dam building. It was signed by 
over 11,000 people, many of them subsistence farmers and fishermen who live along the river’s 
mainstream and its many tributaries. 
Some analysts say that if the worst fears of critics are realized, relations between China and its 
neighbors in mainland Southeast Asia will be severely damaged. But mindful of the growing power and 
influence of China, Southeast Asian governments have muffled their concern. Meanwhile, Laos, 
Cambodia and Thailand have put forward plans to dam their sections of the Mekong mainstream, 
prompting Vietnam to object and undermining the local environmentalists’ case against China. 
2. “China’s Quiet Activists“: 
In China, where grassroots NGOs face many restrictions, legal recognition of a grassroots NGO 
network has no precedent. Onerous regulations make it difficult for NGOs to register and require that 
an NGO find a government agency to be its supervising unit. But finding an agency willing to take on 
the responsibility and risk of supervising an NGO, particularly one working in a politically sensitive 
area, is not easy. As a result, many grassroots NGOs end up registering as businesses or do not 
register at all. In addition to registration problems, NGOs lack domestic funding sources and must rely 
heavily on international funding. They are also viewed with suspicion by local officials and 
communities unfamiliar with NGOs. 
But such challenges are minimal compared to the obstacles faced by NGO networks which are actively 
discouraged by the government. In 2005, a network of environmental NGOs called the China River 
Network formed to protest the government’s plan to build a series of dams along the Nu River in 
Yunnan province. In part because of their efforts, the government decided to suspend building the 
dams. The China River Network, however, could not register and broke up after a year of existence. 
3. A series of pieces on the global history of trade goods 
like chilis, tea, tomatoes,coffee, potatoes,  and tobacco, with frequent mentions of China: 
This legendary drink is reputed to have come from a mistake – 5000 years ago, the Emperor of China 
was shocked to find some tea leaves in his pot of boiling water. Known for his scientific curiosity, he 
proceeded to taste the drink – and he loved it. It did not take long before tea became a staple of 
Chinese culture. By 800 A.D. a Zen Buddhist priest had already written a comprehensive history of its 
use. Tea was adopted into various religious and meditative services by the Zen Buddhists, who found 
that the substance enhanced spiritual concentration. 
4. “Between China and India: Is Tibet the Wedge or the Link?“: 
Tibet is changing from being a barrier to a region linking China and India together. Today, there are 
good roads connecting Tibet to Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan. Three years ago, an amazing 
thousand-kilometer railroad from Golmud in Qinghai to Lhasa in Tibet was opened. Eighty percent of it 
is over 4000 meters in altitude; 50 percent on permafrost.   When first proposed, many foreign 
engineers said that it could not be built. 
Economically, there is much to be gained by improving road and rail links between Tibet and South 
Asia. Indeed, the Chinese have suggested that Lhasa and Calcutta be linked by rail. The Indian 
Government is understandably apprehensive about moving too quickly. Scars of the 1962 War are still 
raw in India. When the Indian Army moved to liberate Bangladesh in December 1971, an important 
factor it considered was the winter snow preventing the Chinese Army from interfering through the 
mountain passes. Thus, the reopening of the 4400 meter-high Nathu La Pass in July 2006 was 
politically significant. As part of it, China recognized India’s ownership of Sikkim. Hundreds of 
kilometers of fiber optic cables have been laid in the past year from Yadong in Tibet to Siliguri in West 
Bengal with an initial capacity of 20 gigabytes per second. 
5. “US-China Duopoly is a Pipedream“: 
If there is no inherent reason why the “world system” cannot accommodate the “rise” of China, there 
are other good reasons why a “Chimerica” or “G-2” is unlikely to emerge as the answer to the 
problems of the near-term future. Most important is the residual deep-seated strategic mistrust 
between the two powers. A strong strain of thought – running through US editorial pages, Congress, 
some quarters of the academy, and the general public – deeply mistrusts China’s long-term ambitions. 
Some worry that China’s military modernization is aimed at undermining US relationships in Asia, and 
eventually at pushing the US out or at least displacing its influence with that of Beijing. Some see 
China’s development of a more capable Navy as presenting a long-term challenge to US supremacy in 
the Pacific and the first step toward controlling the sea lines of commerce that constitute the life link 
of energy-dependent Japan and South Korea. This mutual mistrust surfaced at the Washington 
meeting with Chinese complaints about being barred from buying dual use high-technology items from 
the US. 
The Chinese are no less concerned about US intentions. Many academics, think-tank specialists, and 
government officials remain convinced that the long-term US goal is to “divide and Westernize” the 
People’s Republic. Such attitudes are revealed when Chinese officials blame US support for the Dalai 
Lama, Rebiya Kadeer, pro-democracy activists, and human rights lawyers for the domestic unrest 
created by their own misguided and repressive internal policies. Beijing also sees US efforts to shore 
up its relations with China’s neighbors as part of a long-standing plot to surround China with 
unfriendly countries, US military bases, and other mechanisms for exerting “pressure” on the PRC. 
 
